Designed to Expose Power: The Federalist Papers and the Modern Abandonment of Constitutional Discipline

The Federalist Papers were written with a practical, not utopian, purpose: to secure ratification of the Constitution proposed in 1787 by persuading a skeptical public that durable self-government was possible despite human imperfection. From the opening essay, Alexander Hamilton frames the project as an inquiry into whether societies are capable of establishing good government by “reflection and choice,” or whether they are doomed to drift toward arrangements shaped by passion, accident, or force. The Constitution is thus presented not as an idealized system, but as a calculated response to predictable human behavior.

Written under the pseudonym Publius by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, the Federalist Papers rest on a single, unflinching premise that power will be sought, factions will form, and ambition will assert itself through institutions as readily as through individuals. The central question is not how to perfect human virtue, but how to structure government so that liberty can survive the inevitable misuse of authority.

The solution advanced by the Federalists is neither moral exhortation nor centralized control, but constitutional design. By dispersing power, refining public will through representation, and pitting ambition against ambition, the proposed system seeks to restrain excess without suppressing freedom. Liberty is preserved not by denying conflict, but by channeling it through accountable, limited institutions.

This framework carries an implicit warning. A republic does not fail only through sudden seizure of power; it erodes when factions entrench themselves within durable institutions, when authority is justified by necessity rather than consent, and when structures designed to check ambition instead become vehicles for its consolidation. The Federalist Papers argue that constitutional government survives only so long as its disciplines are maintained and that the gravest danger lies not in open rebellion against the system, but in gradual departures from its logic.

Faction as an Inescapable Feature of Liberty

Madison’s Federalist No. 10 provides the clearest articulation of this premise. He defines faction as a group “united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.” Crucially, Madison rejects the possibility of eliminating faction without destroying liberty itself, noting that “liberty is to faction what air is to fire.”

The Constitution’s solution, therefore, is not moral reform but structural control. By extending the sphere of the republic, multiplying interests, and refining public views through representation, the effects of faction are mitigated without denying freedom. This argument appears repeatedly across the essays and reflects a deliberate rejection of classical republican assumptions that virtue alone could sustain self-government.

Checks, Balances, and the Expectation of Ambition

In Federalist No. 51, Madison makes explicit what the entire project assumes implicitly: “If men were angels, no government would be necessary.” Because they are not, the Constitution must supply internal controls on power. Each branch is given “the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others.”

This system is not designed to produce harmony. It is designed to survive conflict. The separation of powers relies on ambition counteracting ambition, not on trust in the moral character of officeholders. The Federalist Papers thus describe a government that functions precisely because it anticipates misuse of authority.

Hamilton and the Case for Energetic Government

Hamilton’s essays emphasize a different danger: weakness. In Federalist No. 15, he condemns the Articles of Confederation for addressing states “in their collective capacities” rather than individuals, rendering federal authority unenforceable. A government that relies on voluntary compliance, Hamilton argues, is no government at all.

This concern culminates in his defense of a strong executive. In Federalist No. 70, Hamilton contends that “energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government.” Unity, duration, adequate support, and competent powers are presented not as threats to liberty, but as safeguards against instability, foreign interference, and legislative overreach.

Hamilton’s argument is rooted in experience. In Federalist No. 23, he insists that national government must possess powers “coextensive with all the possible combinations of circumstances” that could threaten the Union. Limiting federal authority in advance, he warns, would invite disaster in moments of crisis.

The Judiciary and the Rule of Law

The Federalist Papers also defend an independent judiciary as essential to constitutional government. In Federalist No. 78, Hamilton describes the judiciary as “the least dangerous” branch, possessing neither the sword nor the purse, but only judgment. Its independence is necessary to guard the Constitution against legislative encroachments and to ensure that fundamental law prevails over temporary political passions.

Here again, the authors assume fallibility. Judges are not virtuous by nature; they are constrained by lifetime tenure and constitutional limits to preserve impartiality over time.

A Constitution of Prudence, Not Perfection

Across the essays, the Constitution is presented not as flawless, but as preferable to known alternatives. In Federalist No. 38, Madison compares criticism of the Constitution to condemning the work of human hands for failing to achieve divine perfection. The relevant question is not whether the document is ideal, but whether it is better than what preceded it—and whether it can be improved through lawful means.

The Federalist Papers repeatedly acknowledge risk. They do not deny the possibility of abuse. Instead, they argue that the proposed system offers the best available structure of controlling power while preserving liberty in a large republic.

Federalist Warnings for a Modern Republic

The Federalist Papers warned that the most serious threat to a republic would arise gradually, as power consolidated within institutions rather than being seized outright. Madison cautioned that faction becomes most dangerous when it embeds itself structurally and operates through durable influence rather than open persuasion. That danger is now visible within modern political parties, where internal factions increasingly pursue dominance through procedural control and institutional leverage rather than electoral debate.

This same pattern appears in modern collectivist governance (here as well). Madison warned that liberty is endangered when authority is centralized and justified primarily by necessity rather than consent (Federalist No. 51). Administrative solutions now routinely substitute bureaucratic coordination for representative deliberation, shifting power away from accountable institutions and toward permanent governing structures. This erosion of consent reflects the precise risk that Federalists sought to constrain.

The judiciary illustrates a parallel strain. Hamilton argues that courts would retain legitimacy only so long as they exercised judgment rather than will (Federalist No. 78). When lower court judges such as James Boasberg repeatedly act as activists (his rulings are subsequently reversed (see Trump v. J. G. G.)), the warning is evident. Repeated reversal signals that judicial authority is being tested beyond its intended bounds, precisely the form of ambition Hamilton would require correction through higher review (Federalist No. 78).

Madison also understood that faction does not operate solely through elected office. Influence itself can become a vehicle for consolidation when it flows through respected intermediary institutions (Federalist No. 10). When organizations such as the American Bar Association consistently adopt and advance a single political posture (more links here and here - many others available), they risk transforming professional authority into institutionalized factional influence. Hamilton’s confidence in judicial independence rested on the assumption of a legal culture committed to impartial judgment rather than ideological alignment (Federalist No. 78).

The scale of the modern federal government further underscores the relevance of these warnings. Hamilton defended energetic government for defined national purposes (Federalist No. 23), while Madison emphasized that federal powers would remain few and defined (Federalist No. 45). The contemporary federal apparatus, vast in scope, has expanded to a degree that exceeds anything the Founders plausibly contemplated. What was designed as a limited national authority now functions as a comprehensive administrative presence, raising the very concern Madison warned would threaten republican liberty over time.

The Federalist Papers did not claim that constitutional design would prevent ambition, faction, or overreach. They claimed it would expose them. When power consolidates within parties, institutions, professions, and government itself, the failure is not constitutional design. It is the abandonment of the discipline the Constitution requires.